Publications

@misc{csikor2026nanog,
  title = {Achieving QUIC's Full Potential: How a DNS Deployment Gap Is Limiting HTTP/3 Performance},
  author = {L. Csikor and D. M. Divakaran},
  year = {2026},
  date = {2026-02-02},
  abstract={The growing complexity of web browsing, driven by the widespread adoption of HTTPS and 
  privacy-enhancing protocols like DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), introduces significant network overhead. 
  This is caused by a cascade of sequential handshakes and information retrievals—including DNS resolution, 
  TLS setup, and protocol negotiation—that can cause substantial latency before a single byte of content is delivered. 
  As a result, users often experience sub-optimal performance even on high-speed connections.
  In this presentation, we demonstrate how leveraging newly standardized DNS HTTPS records (RFC 9460) can 
  significantly reduce this overhead. We will show how a missing link between browser capabilities and web server 
  configurations prevents the full benefits of protocols like QUIC/HTTP/3 from being realized. 
  Through our open-source WebTrafficSphere tool and the apexDNS proof-of-concept, we show how to transparently 
  deliver the necessary endpoint information to the browser, bypassing unnecessary negotiation and reducing 
  packet exchanges by up to 50%.},
  urldate = {2026-02-02},
  howpublished = {NANOG 96, General Session},
  url = {https://nanog.org/events/nanog-96/content/5570/},
  pdf={/papers/nanog_slides.pdf},
  keywords = {dns, DoQ, http3, quic},
  tags = {talk}
}

@misc{ramachandran2026drishtiailedhumandirectedvulnerability,
  title={Drishti: AI-Led Human-Directed Vulnerability Auditing for 5G Cores}, 
  author={S. Ramachandran and L. Csikor and D. M. Divakaran},
  year={2026},
  pdf = {/papers/drishti.pdf},
  eprint={2608.30112},
  archivePrefix={arXiv},
  primaryClass={cs.CR},
  url={https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.30112}, 
  tags={Accepted at ACM CCS CPSIoTSec Workshop},
  abstract={Candidate generation for open-source vulnerabilities is no longer scarce. 
  AI-assisted code review now produces defect candidates cheaply, and industry programs 
  pair them with expert human triage. The remaining scarcity is validation and impact assessment, 
  and the gap is largest in critical-infrastructure software like 5G cores. Here, validation costs 
  split along four axes: verification that a candidate is a real defect, reachability under a realistic 
  attacker model, impact on a deployed stack, and fix-completeness against the vulnerability class rather 
  than the reported instance.
  We present Drishti, an AI-led human-directed vulnerability audit framework built from four scaffolds, 
  one per cost: (i) an anti-pattern catalog of recurring defect-producing code patterns in cellular-core 
  codebases; (ii) a 3GPP-procedure-driven triage that prioritizes attacker-reachable procedures; 
  (iii) concentric validation across four stages, each more expensive than the last; and (iv) a separable 
  patch-defect axis that re-reads shipped CVE fixes from the original attacker's position. Across audits of 
  Open5GS and free5GC, Drishti produced three findings: 1) a pre-authentication NULL-dereference in 
  Open5GS's NRF multipart parser, fixed upstream and submitted to MITRE for a CVE; 2) an ASN.1-PER memory 
  amplification in free5GC's NGAP decoder, where a 2-byte pre-authentication input from a rogue gNodeB 
  OOM-kills the AMF in 6.2 seconds; and 3) a defective patch on CVE-2025-69248 whose intended defense-in-depth 
  check is dead code on the pre-authentication path.},
  howpublished={arXiv}
  }

@ARTICLE{11368662,
  author={B. Wu and D. M. Divakaran and L. Csikor and M. Gurusamy},
  journal={IEEE Communications Magazine}, 
  title={RECTor: Robust and Efficient Correlation Attack on Tor}, 
  year={2026},
  abstract={Tor is a widely used anonymity network that conceals user identities by routing 
  traffic through encrypted relays, yet it remains vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks 
  that deanonymize users by matching patterns in ingress and egress traffic. However, existing 
  correlation methods suffer from two major limitations: limited robustness to noise and partial 
  observations, and poor scalability due to computationally expensive pairwise matching. 
  To address these challenges, we propose RECTor, a machine learning-based framework for traffic 
  correlation under realistic conditions. RECTor employs attention-based Multiple Instance Learning (MIL) 
  and GRU-based temporal encoding to extract robust flow representations, even when traffic data is 
  incomplete or obfuscated. These embeddings are mapped into a shared space via a Siamese network, and 
  efficiently matched using approximate nearest neighbor (aNN) search. Empirical evaluations show that 
  RECTor outperforms state-of-the-art baselines such as DeepCorr, DeepCOFFEA, and FlowTracker - achieving 
  up to 60% higher true positive rates under high-noise conditions, and reducing training and inference time 
  by over 50%. Moreover, RECTor demonstrates strong scalability: inference cost grows near-linearly as the 
  number of flows increases. These findings reveal critical vulnerabilities in Tor's anonymity model and 
  highlight the need for advanced model-aware defenses.},
  volume={},
  number={},
  pages={1-7},
  keywords={Correlation, Relays, Circuits, Noise measurement, Noise, Threat modeling, 
  Computer architecture, Servers,Scalability,Robustness},
  doi={10.1109/MCOM.001.2500251},
  tags = {magazine},
  pdf={/papers/rector.pdf}
  }

@article{doq_commag,
title = {DNS-over-QUIC and HTTP/3 in the Era of Transformers: The New Internet Privacy Battle},
author = {L. Csikor and Z. Lian and H. Zhang and N. Lakshmanan and D. M. Divakaran},
editor = {Dr. Nils Nordbotten and EiC Prof. Rose Qingyang Hu},
pdf = {/papers/doq-commag.pdf},
doi = {10.1109/MCOM.004.2400680},
issn = {1558-1896 },
year = {2025},
date = {2025-06-02},
urldate = {2025-06-02},
journal = {IEEE Communications Magazine},
pages = {1-7},
abstract = {Moving away from plain-text DNS communications, users now can switch to encrypted DNS protocols for name resolutions. DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) employs QUIC—the latest transport protocol—for encrypted communications between users and their recursive DNS servers. QUIC is also poised to become the foundation of our daily web browsing by becoming the transport for HTTP/3, the latest version of the HTTP protocol. Traditional TCP-based web browsing is vulnerable to website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks that can identify the websites a user visits. The emergence of QUIC-based DNS and HTTP protocols raises an important question: are regular users better protected from WFP attacks when using these new protocols?
To investigate this, we first collect and publicly release the first benchmark dataset of network traffic corresponding to real visits to QUIC-enabled websites while using DoQ for domain resolution. This dataset will help advance the research on WFP attacks and defenses. Second, we implement and evaluate the
first WFP attack targeting the combined use of DoQ and HTTP/3 protocols by users by developing two transformer models tailored for WFP attacks. Finally, we conduct comprehensive experiments, which reveal that these models are effective in identifying user-visited websites, emphasizing the need for defensive measures.},
note = {( Early Access )},
keywords = {dns, DoQ, privacy, website fingerprinting},
tags = {magazine},
pubstate = {published},
}

@inproceedings{khooi_junction,
title = {JUNCTION: A Scalable Multi-Access Solution Using Programmable Switches},
author = {X. Z. Khooi and C. H. Song and S. K. Permal and N. Budhdev and L. Csikor and R. Joshi and M. C. Chan},
pdf = {/papers/junction.pdf},
doi = {10.1109/SECON64284.2024.10934954},
issn = {2155-5494},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-12-01},
urldate = {2024-12-01},
booktitle = {2024 21st Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON)},
pages = {1-9},
publisher = {IEEE},
organization = {IEEE},
abstract = {Multi-access networks are increasingly important for reliable end-to-end connectivity and enhanced throughput performance. A scalable multi-access solution is required to roll out multi-access networks at scale. However, existing CPU-based solutions can no longer scale sustainably, as network traffic has outgrown the CPU performance growth. Consequently, hardware accelerators offer a compelling alternative. This paper introduces JUNCTION, a scalable multi-access solution designed using programmable switches. JUNCTION features a multipath protocol tailored to the hardware constraints and optimized for efficient memory utilization, enabling it to handle a large number of multipath sessions. We validate JUNCTION on a 5G-WiFi multi-access testbed. Our analysis demonstrates that it can scale an order of magnitude better than existing solutions.},
keywords = {5G, in-network, multi-access networks, p4, programmable switches},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@article{10.1145/3627827,
title = {RollBack: A New Time-Agnostic Replay Attack Against the Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems},
author = {L. Csikor and H. W. Lim and J. W. Wong and S. Ramesh and R. P. Parameswarath and M. C. Chan},
pdf = {/papers/rollback-acm-tcps.pdf},
doi = {10.1145/3627827},
issn = {2378-962X},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-01-14},
urldate = {2024-01-14},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems},
volume = {8},
number = {5},
issue = {1},
pages = {1-25},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
abstract = {Automotive Keyless Entry (RKE) systems provide car owners with a degree of convenience, allowing them to lock and unlock their car without using a mechanical key. Today’s RKE systems implement disposable rolling codes, making every key fob button press unique, effectively preventing simple replay attacks. However, a prior attack called RollJam was proven to break all rolling code–based systems in general. By a careful sequence of signal jamming, capturing, and replaying, an attacker can become aware of the subsequent valid unlock signal that has not been used yet. RollJam, however, requires continuous deployment indefinitely until it is exploited. Otherwise, the captured signals become invalid if the key fob is used again without RollJam in place.We introduce RollBack, a new replay-and-resynchronize attack against most of today’s RKE systems. In particular, we show that even though the one-time code becomes invalid in rolling code systems, replaying a few previously captured signals consecutively can trigger a rollback-like mechanism in the RKE system. Put differently, the rolling codes become resynchronized back to a previous code used in the past from where all subsequent yet already used signals work again. Moreover, the victim can still use the key fob without noticing any difference before and after the attack.Unlike RollJam, RollBack does not necessitate jamming at all. In fact, it requires signal capturing only once and can be exploited at any time in the future as many times as desired. This time-agnostic property is particularly attractive to attackers, especially in car-sharing/renting scenarios in which accessing the key fob is straightforward. However, while RollJam defeats virtually any rolling code–based system, vehicles might have additional anti-theft measures against malfunctioning key fobs, hence against RollBack. Our ongoing analysis (with crowd-sourced data) against different vehicle makes and models has revealed that ∼ 50% of the examined vehicles in the Asian region are vulnerable to RollBack, whereas the impact tends to be smaller in other regions, such as Europe and North America.},
note = {Open Access},
keywords = {attack, black hat, keyfob, replay, security},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {journal}
}

@online{dns_evolution,
title = {The Evolution of DNS Security and Privacy},
author = {L. Csikor and D. M. Divakaran},
pdf = {/papers/dns-evolution.pdf},
doi = { https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2312.04577 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-01},
urldate = {2023-12-01},
issue = {arXiv},
abstract = { DNS, one of the fundamental protocols of the TCP/IP stack, has evolved over the years to protect against threats and attacks. This study examines the risks associated with DNS and explores recent advancements that contribute towards making the DNS ecosystem resilient against various attacks while safeguarding user privacy. },
howpublished = {arXiv},
keywords = {dns, doh, DoQ, privacy, security},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {preprint, arXiv only}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2022acsac,
title = {ZeroDNS: Towards Better Zero Trust Security Using DNS},
author = {L. Csikor and S. Ramachandran and A. Lakshminarayanan},
pdf = {/papers/zerodns-acsac.pdf},
doi = {10.1145/3564625.3567968},
isbn = {9781450397599},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-05},
urldate = {2022-12-05},
booktitle = {Proc. Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC)},
pages = {699-713},
publisher = {ACM},
address = {Austin, TX, USA},
keywords = {dns, mtls, security, zero-trust},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference},
abstract={Due to the increasing adoption of public cloud services, virtualization, 
IoT, and emerging 5G technologies, enterprise network
services and users, e.g., remote workforce, can be at any physical
location. This results in that network perimeter cannot be defined
precisely anymore, making adequate access control with traditional
perimeter-based network security models (e.g., firewall, DMZ) challenging. 
The Zero Trust (ZT) network access framework breaks
with this traditional approach by removing the implicit trust in
the network. ZT demands strong authentication, authorization,
and encryption techniques irrespective of the physical location of
the devices. While several prominent companies have embraced
ZT (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Cloudflare), its adoption has several
obstacles.
In this paper, we focus on three problems with practical deployment of ZT. 
First, the DNS infrastructure, a critical entity in every
network, does not adhere to ZT principles, i.e., anyone can access
the DNS and resolve a domain name or leverage it with malicious
intent. Second, ZT's authorization procedures require new entities in the network 
to authorize and verify access requests, which
can result in changes in preferred network routes (hence requiring additional 
traffic engineering), as well as introduce potential
bottlenecks. Thirdly, ZT adds additional time cost, increasing the
time-to-first-byte (TTFB).
We propose ZeroDNS, wherein the control plane of Zero Trust is
implemented using the DNS infrastructure, obviating the need for a
separate entity to issue authorization tokens. Since the control plane
is implemented using DNS, it reduces the number of round-trips
authorized clients require before accessing an enterprise resource
(e.g., web service). Furthermore, we apply ZT principles to DNS,
meaning access to DNS requires authentication, authorization, and
encrypted communication. ZeroDNS uses mutual TLS for DNS
communication for authentication, and only permitted clients with
valid certificates can query domain names. We implement ZeroDNS
on top of NGINX, a reverse proxy typically used as a load-balancer in
enterprise settings. We show that the additional packet processing
time in ZeroDNS has a negligible impact on the overall name
resolution latency, yet it decreases TTFB.}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2022blackhat,
title = {RollBack - A New Time-Agnostic Replay Attack Against the Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems},
author = {L. Csikor and H. W.Lim and S. Ramesh and J. W. Wong and R. P. Parameswarath and C. M. Choon},
pdf = {/papers/blackhat-rollback-whitepaper.pdf},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-08-11},
urldate = {2022-08-11},
booktitle = {BlackHat USA Briefings},
keywords = {attack, black hat, keyfob, replay, rollback},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference},
awards={talk},
abstract = {Automotive Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems implement disposable rolling codes, making every key
fob button press unique, effectively preventing simple replay attacks. However, RollJam was proven to
break all rolling code-based systems in general. By a careful sequence of signal jamming, capturing, and
replaying, an attacker can become aware of the subsequent valid unlock signal1 that has not been used
yet. RollJam, however, requires continuous deployment indefinitely until it is exploited. Otherwise, the
captured signals become invalid if the key fob is used again without RollJam in place.
We introduce RollBack, a new replay-and-resynchronize attack against most of today's RKE systems.
In particular, we show that even though the one-time code becomes invalid in rolling code systems,
replaying a few previously captured signals consecutively can trigger a rollback-like mechanism in the
RKE system. Put differently, the rolling codes become resynchronized back to a previous code used in
the past from where all subsequent yet already used signals work again. Moreover, the victim can still
use the key fob without noticing any difference before and after the attack.
Unlike RollJam, RollBack does not necessitate jamming at all. Furthermore, it requires signal cap-
turing only once and can be exploited any time in the future as many times as desired. This time-agnostic
property is particularly attractive to attackers, especially in car-sharing/renting scenarios where accessing
the key fob is straightforward. However, while RollJam defeats virtually any rolling code-based system,
vehicles might have additional anti-theft measures against malfunctioning key fobs, hence against Roll-
Back. Our ongoing analysis (covering Asian vehicle manufacturers for the time being) against different
vehicle makes and models using RKE implementations from NXP revealed that more than 80% of them
are vulnerable to RollBack.}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2021doh,
title = {Privacy of DNS-over-HTTPS: Requiem for a Dream?},
author = {L. Csikor and H. Singh and M. S. Kang and D. M. Divakaran},
pdf = {/papers/doh-eurosp.pdf},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-01},
urldate = {2021-01-01},
booktitle = {IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy},
keywords = {dns, doh, machine learning, privacy},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference},
abstract={The recently proposed DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)
protocol is becoming increasingly popular in addressing
the privacy concerns of exchanging plain-text DNS messages 
over potentially malicious transit networks (e.g., mass
surveillance at ISPs). By employing HTTPS to encrypt DNS
communications, DoH traffic inherently becomes indistinguishable 
from regular encrypted Web traffic, rendering
active disruption (e.g., downgrading to the plain-text DNS)
by transit networks extremely hard. In this work, we investigate 
whether DoH traffic is indeed indistinguishable
from encrypted Web traffic. To this end, we collect several
DoH traffic traces corresponding to 25 resolvers (including
major ones, e.g., Google and Cloudflare) by visiting thousands 
of domains in Alexa's list of top-ranked websites at
different geographical locations and environments. Based on
the collected traffic, we train a machine learning model
to classify HTTPS traffic as either Web or DoH. With
our DoH identification model in place, we show that an
authoritarian ISP can identify ~97.4% (~90%) of the DoH
packets correctly in a closed-world (open-world) setting while
only misclassifying 1 in 10, 000 Web packets. To counter this
DoH identification model, we propose an effective mitigation
technique, making the identification model impractical for
ISPs to filter and consequently downgrade DoH to plain-text
DNS communications.}
}

@article{csikor2020ton_harmless,
title = {Transition to SDN is HARMLESS: Hybrid Architecture for Migrating Legacy Ethernet Switches to SDN},
author = {L. Csikor and M. Szalay and G. Rétvári and G. Pongrácz and D. P. Pezaros and L. Toka},
pdf = {/papers/harmless-ton.pdf},
doi = {10.1109/TNET.2019.2958762},
issn = {1063-6692},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-02-01},
urldate = {2020-02-01},
journal = {IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.},
volume = {28},
number = {1},
pages = {275-288},
publisher = {IEEE Press},
keywords = {migration, openflow, sdn, switch design},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {journal}
}

@article{DBLP:journals/corr/abs-2011-09107,
title = {On the Feasibility and Enhancement of the Tuple Space Explosion Attack against Open vSwitch},
author = {L. Csikor and V. Ujawane and D. M. Divakaran},
pdf = {/papers/tuple-space-explosion.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
urldate = {2020-01-01},
journal = {CoRR},
volume = {abs/2011.09107},
keywords = {attack, denial-of-service, openflow, ovs, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {preprint}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2020dida,
title = {DIDA: Distributed In-Network Defense Architecture Against Amplified Reflection DDoS Attacks},
author = {X. Z. Khooi and L. Csikor and D. M. Divakaran and M. S. Kang},
pdf = {/papers/dida-netsoft.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
urldate = {2020-01-01},
booktitle = {2020 6th IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft)},
pages = {277-281},
keywords = {amplification attack, denial-of-service, detection, mitigation},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2020p4robot,
title = {Towards Low Latency Industrial Robot Control in Programmable Data Planes},
author = {F. E. R. Cesen and L. Csikor and C. Recalde and C. E. Rothenberg and G. Pongrácz},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
urldate = {2020-01-01},
booktitle = {2020 6th IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft)},
pages = {165-169},
keywords = {p4, robot},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2020tda_poster,
title = {Towards In-Network Time-Decaying Aggregates for Heavy-Hitter Detection},
author = {X. Z. Khooi and L. Csikor and M. S. Kang and D. M. Divakaran},
pdf = {/papers/tda-poster.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
urldate = {2020-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2020 Conference on Posters and Demos},
publisher = {ACM},
address = {New York, USA},
series = {SIGCOMM '20},
keywords = {heavy-hitter, in-network, network monitoring},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {poster}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2020dida_demo,
title = {In-Network Defense Against AR-DDoS Attacks},
author = {X.Z. Khooi and L. Csikor and M. S. Kang and D. M. Divakaran},
pdf = {/papers/dida-demo.pdf},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
urldate = {2020-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2020 Conference on Posters and Demos},
publisher = {ACM},
address = {New York, USA},
series = {SIGCOMM '20},
keywords = {attack, denial-of-service, in-network, p4},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2019ovs2,
title = {The Discrepancy of the Megaflow Cache in OVS, Part II},
author = {L. Csikor and M. S. Kang and D. M. Divakaran},
pdf = {/papers/csikor2019ovs2.pdf},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-12-01},
urldate = {2019-12-01},
booktitle = {OVS+OVN Conference},
address = {Red Hat Headquarters, Boston, MA, USA},
keywords = {denial-of-service, openflow, ovs, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2019tse,
title = {Tuple Space Explosion: A Denial-of-Service Attack against a Software Packet Classifier},
author = {L. Csikor and D. M. Divakaran and M. S. Kang and A. Kőrösi and B. Sonkoly and D. Haja and D. P. Pezaros and S. Schmid and G. Rétvári},
pdf = {/papers/csikor2019tse.pdf},
doi = {10.1145/3359989.3365431},
isbn = {9781450369985},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-01-01},
urldate = {2019-01-01},
booktitle = {Proc. International Conference on Emerging Networking Experiments And Technologies},
pages = {292-304},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {Orlando, Florida},
series = {CoNEXT '19},
keywords = {attack, denial-of-service, detection, mitigation, openflow, ovs, sdn, security},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2018sigcomm1,
title = {BB-Gen: A Packet Crafter for P4 Target Evaluation},
author = {F. C. E. Rodriguez and G. Patra and L. Csikor and C. E. Rothenberg and S. Laki and P. Vörös and G. Pongrácz},
url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3234200.3234229},
doi = {10.1145/3234200.3234229},
isbn = {978-1-4503-5915-3},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2018 Conference on Posters and Demos},
pages = {111-113},
publisher = {ACM},
address = {Budapest, Hungary},
series = {SIGCOMM '18},
keywords = {p4, performance, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2018sigcomm2,
title = {Policy Injection: A Cloud Dataplane DoS Attack},
author = {L. Csikor and C. E. Rothenberg and D. P. Pezaros and S. Schmid and L. Toka and G. Rétvári},
doi = {10.1145/3234200.3234250},
isbn = {978-1-4503-5915-3},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2018 Conference on Posters and Demos},
pages = {147-149},
publisher = {ACM},
address = {Budapest, Hungary},
series = {SIGCOMM '18},
keywords = {attack, denial-of-service, ovs, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@article{csikor_jsac,
title = {Towards a Sweet Spot of Dataplane Programmability, Portability and Performance: On the Scalability of Multi-Architecture P4 Pipelines},
author = {G. Patra and F. C. E. Rodriguez and J. S. Mejia and D. Feferman and L. Csikor and C. E. Rothenberg and G. Pongrácz},
doi = {10.1109/JSAC.2018.2871288},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
journal = {IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Scalability Issues and Solutions for Software Defined Networks},
keywords = {in-network, p4, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {journal}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2018networking,
title = {HARMLESS: Cost-Effective Transitioning to SDN for Small Enterprises},
author = {L. Csikor and L. Toka and M. Szalay and G. Pongrácz and D. P. Pezaros and G. Rétvári},
pdf = {/papers/csikor2018networking.pdf},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of IFIP Netwoking},
keywords = {migration, openflow, ovs, sdn, switch design},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csikor_ovs,
title = {The Discrepancy of the Megaflow Cache in OVS},
author = {L. Csikor and G. Rétvári},
pdf = {/papers/csikor-ovs-2018.pdf},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
booktitle = {Open vSwitch Fall Conference},
address = {Club Auto Sport, Santa Clara, CA},
keywords = {attack, denial-of-service, openflow, ovs, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2017globecom,
title = {End-host Driven Troubleshooting Architecture for Software-Defined Networking},
author = {L. Csikor and D. P. Pezaros},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-01},
urldate = {2017-01-01},
booktitle = {IEEE Globecom 2017},
pages = {1-7},
publisher = {IEEE},
address = {Singapore},
keywords = {network monitoring, openflow, sdn, troubleshooting},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2017sigcomm,
title = {HARMLESS: Cost-Effective Transitioning to SDN},
author = {M. Szalay and L. Toka and G. Rétvári and G. Pongrácz and L. Csikor and D. P. Pezaros},
url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3123878.3131997},
doi = {10.1145/3123878.3131997},
isbn = {978-1-4503-5057-0},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-01},
urldate = {2017-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the SIGCOMM Posters and Demos},
pages = {91-93},
publisher = {ACM},
address = {Los Angeles, CA, USA},
series = {SIGCOMM Posters and Demos '17},
keywords = {migration, openflow, ovs, sdn, switch design},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{molnar2016sigcomm,
title = {Dataplane Specialization for High-performance OpenFlow Software Switching},
author = {L. Molnár and G. Pongrácz and G. Enyedi and Z. Kis and L. Csikor and F. Juhász and A. Kőrösi and G. Rétvári},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-01-01},
urldate = {2016-01-01},
booktitle = {ACM SIGCOMM},
keywords = {openflow, ovs, performance, switch design},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@article{csikor_telsys2015,
title = {On Providing Fast Protection with Remote Loop-Free Alternates},
author = {L. Csikor and G. Rétvári},
pdf = {/papers/csikor-telsys2015.pdf},
doi = {10.1007/s11235-015-0006-9},
issn = {1572-9451},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-03-01},
urldate = {2015-03-01},
journal = {Telecommunication Systems Journal},
volume = {60},
number = {4},
pages = {485-502},
publisher = {Springer US},
keywords = {loop-free alternates, protection, resilience},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {journal}
}

@inproceedings{nemethb2015nfvsdn,
title = {Customizable real-time service graph mapping algorithm in carrier grade networks},
author = {B. Németh and J. Czentye and G. Vaszkun and L. Csikor and B. Sonkoly},
pdf = {/papers/nemethb2015nfvsdn.pdf},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-01},
urldate = {2015-01-01},
booktitle = {IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networks Demo Track (NFV-SDN)},
pages = {30-32},
address = {San Francisco, CA, USA},
keywords = {nfv, orchestratiopn, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{csikor2015nfvsdn,
title = {NFPA: Network Function Performance Analyzer},
author = {L. Csikor and M. Szalay and B. Sonkoly and L. Toka},
pdf = {/papers/csikor2015nfvsdn.pdf},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-01},
urldate = {2015-01-01},
booktitle = {IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networks Demo Track (NFV-SDN)},
pages = {17-19},
address = {San Francisco, CA, USA},
keywords = {nfv, performance, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{ewsdn2014,
title = {Multi-layered Service Orchestration in a Multi-Domain Network Environment},
author = {A. Csoma and B. Sonkoly and L. Csikor and F. Németh and A. Gulyás and D. Jocha and J. Elek and W. Tavernier and S. Sahhaf},
pdf = {/papers/ewsdn2014.pdf},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-09-01},
urldate = {2014-09-01},
booktitle = {EWSDN (DEMO)},
address = {Budapest, Hungary},
keywords = {mininet, netconf, nfv, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{sonkoly2014sdn,
title = {SDN based testbeds for evaluating and promoting multipath TCP},
author = {B. Sonkoly and F. Németh and L. Csikor and A. L. Gulyás and A. Gulyás},
pdf = {/papers/sonkoly2014sdn.pdf},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-01-01},
urldate = {2014-01-01},
booktitle = {Proc. IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)},
pages = {3044-3050},
organization = {IEEE},
keywords = {mptcp, performance, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference}
}

@inproceedings{csoma2014escape,
title = {ESCAPE: Extensible Service Chain Prototyping Environment Using Mininet, Click, NETCONF and POX},
author = {A. Csoma and B. Sonkoly and L. Csikor and F. Németh and A. Gulyás and W. Tavernier and S. Sahhaf},
url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2619239.2631448},
doi = {10.1145/2619239.2631448},
isbn = {978-1-4503-2836-4},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-01-01},
urldate = {2014-01-01},
booktitle = {ACM SIGCOMM (DEMO)},
pages = {125-126},
publisher = {ACM},
address = {Chicago, Illinois, USA},
keywords = {mininet, netconf, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{nemethf_multipath_playground2013,
title = {A Large-Scale Multipath Playground for Experimenters and Early Adopters},
author = {F. Németh and B. Sonkoly and L. Csikor and A. Gulyás},
pdf = {/papers/nemethf-multipath-playground2013.pdf},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-08-01},
urldate = {2013-08-01},
booktitle = {ACM SIGCOMM (DEMO)},
pages = {482-483},
address = {Hong Kong, China},
keywords = {mptcp, performance, planetlab, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@inproceedings{nemethf_ons2013,
title = {Improving resiliency and throughput of transport networks with OpenFlow and Multipath TCP: Demonstration of results over the Géant OpenFlow testbed (Demonstration of results over the Géant OpenFlow testbed)},
author = {F. Németh and B. Sonkoly and L. Csikor and A. Gulyás},
pdf = {/papers/nemethf-ons2013.pdf},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-04-01},
urldate = {2013-04-01},
booktitle = {Open Networking Summit (DEMO)},
address = {Santa Clara, USA},
keywords = {openflow, performance, resilience, sdn},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {demo}
}

@incollection{csikor2013high,
title = {High Availability in the Future Internet},
author = {L. Csikor and G. Rétvári and J. Tapolcai},
pdf = {/papers/csikor2013high.pdf},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
booktitle = {The Future Internet},
pages = {64-76},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {IP Fast ReRoute, loop-free alternates, protection, resilience},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {book chapter}
}

@article{csikor2012cc,
title = {Optimizing IGP Link Costs for Improving IP-level Resilience with Loop-Free Alternates},
author = {L. Csikor and G. Rétvári and J. Tapolcai},
pdf = {/papers/csikor2012cc.pdf},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
journal = {Computer Communications Journal},
volume = {36},
number = {6},
pages = {645-655},
publisher = {Elsevier},
keywords = {IP Fast ReRoute, loop-free alternates, resilience},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {journal}
}

@inproceedings{csikor_rndm2012,
title = {IP Fast Reroute with Remote Loop-Free Alternates: the Unit Link Cost Case},
author = {L. Csikor and G. Rétvári},
pdf = {/papers/csikor-rndm2012.pdf},
issn = {2157-0221},
year = {2012},
date = {2012-10-01},
urldate = {2012-10-01},
booktitle = {Proc. RNDM},
pages = {16-22},
keywords = {IP Fast ReRoute, loop-free alternates, protection, resilience},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference},
awards = {Best paper runner-up}
}

@article{csikorinformation,
title = {Information Spreading in Self Organizing Mobile Network},
author = {L. Csikor and Z. Fehér},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-08-01},
journal = {MACRo},
keywords = {bluetooth, discovery, network, social},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {journal}
}

@inproceedings{retvari2011lfa_drcn,
title = {Optimizing IGP Link Costs for Improving IP-level Resilience},
author = {G. Rétvári and L. Csikor and J. Tapolcai and G. Enyedi and A. Császár},
pdf = {/papers/retvari2011lfa_drcn.pdf},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
urldate = {2011-01-01},
booktitle = {Proc. International Workshop on Design Of Reliable Communication
Networks (DRCN)},
pages = {62-69},
address = {Krakow, Poland},
keywords = {IP Fast ReRoute, loop-free alternates, protection, resilience},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {conference},
awards = {Best paper}
}

@article{csikor_combined_method,
title = {Network Optimization Techniques for Improving Fast IP-level Resilience with Loop-Free Alternates},
author = {L. Csikor and M. Nagy and G. Rétvári},
issn = {2061-2079},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
urldate = {2011-01-01},
journal = {Infocommunications Journal},
volume = {3},
number = {4},
pages = {2-10},
address = {Budapest, Kossuth Lajos sqr., Hungary},
keywords = {IP Fast ReRoute, loop-free alternates, protection, resilience},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {journal}
}

@article{csikorexploring,
title = {Exploring Hidden Relations in Moving Human Groups},
author = {L. Csikor and Z. Fehér},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-01-01},
urldate = {2010-01-01},
booktitle = {POSTER},
address = {Prague, CZ},
keywords = {bluetooth, discovery, network, social},
pubstate = {published},
tags = {poster}
}